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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the impact of business cycles on earnings 
management in the United States. Using a large cohort of firms in the United 
States from the S&P 1500 index and the period of 2000-2010, we employ 
estimates based on a pooled least squares model, a fixed effects model, and a 
random effects model. Our findings show that firm discretionary accruals increase 
during expansionary economic periods and decrease during contractionary 
periods. We also find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had no effect on mitigating 
discretionary accruals. Our primary contribution to the existing literature is a 
thorough econometric analysis of discretionary accruals and their relationship to 
economic cycles and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act using a large and comprehensive 
data set.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Earnings management refers to the willful attempts by managers o f a firm 
to manipulate their earnings to meet pre-determined targets. ‘Earnings’ refers in 
its simplest form to the profits of a company, and earnings management refers to 
the practice of cooking books and creating juiced-up accounts. Investors and 
analysts look to earnings to determine the attractiveness of a particular stock. The 
management of profits is sometimes used interchangeably with income 
smoothing1. Motivations for this management of earnings vary, but common 
reasons are (a) to meet targets of profitability set by analysts or the market, (b) to 
convey information about future earnings, (c) to signal the market as a low risk 
firm, and (d) to appropriate executive compensations, like bonuses, stock options 
etc.
Earnings management has become a topic of increased interest for 
financial regulators. The numerous recent accounting scandals (like Enron, 
WorldCom, Parmlat, Waste Management, Tyco, Satyam, Olympus, etc.) has cast 
doubts about truthfulness o f the financial statements o f firms and eroded investor 
confidence and adversely affected market sentiments. Industry regulators, 
auditors, analysts and company stakeholders (whether individual or institutional 
investors) all have a substantial interest in transparent and accurate earnings
1 Income smoothing is a form of earnings management and is generally defined as the smoothing 
of reported earnings over time (Ronen and Yaari, 2008, p. 317)
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information and can greatly benefit from greater accuracy in financial reporting 
by firms.
Healy and Wahlen (1999) state ‘...earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers’. Most o f the empirical literature on 
earnings management has centered on how firms keep two sets of accounts (one 
internally) with one to be publicly issued, whether for required reporting or for an 
initial public offer (Dechow et al., 1995; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Graham et al., 
2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 2008).
Prior literature has classified earnings management into two broad 
categories: real earnings management (i.e. affecting cash flows) and accruals 
management (through changes in accounting policies and calculations). 
Roychowdhury (2006) states that operational decisions such as acceleration o f 
sales, alterations in shipment schedules, delaying of research and development, 
and delaying of maintenance expenditures are all real earnings management 
methods available to managers. The amount of managed earnings is the difference 
between reported earnings and true earnings. The most common way of detecting 
accrual-based earnings management is through company financial statements. 
Accounting adjustments known as accruals are the difference between reported 
earnings and operating cash flows. Accruals consist of a discretionary portion 
which is often manipulated by managers and a non-discretionary portion which is
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dictated by business conditions. There exists considerable difficulty to accurately 
separate reported accruals into their managed (discretionary) and unmanaged 
(non-discretionary) components. Researchers use empirical models to decompose 
total accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Discretionary 
accruals are then used as proxy for earnings management. The most widely used 
discretionary accrual models are the Jones and ‘modified’ Jones models which 
used the variables o f ‘firm revenues’, ‘gross property, plant, and equipment’, and 
‘total assets’, to break down the total accruals values into non-discretionary and 
discretionary components.
Earnings management is broadly classified into three types: white, gray, 
and black (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). White refers to earnings management where 
reports are made more transparent to emphasize private information about fixture 
cash flows. Gray earnings management refers to choosing a particular accounting 
treatment that is opportunistic or economically efficient. Black earnings 
management refers to willful tricks and misrepresentation, or purposefully 
decreasing the transparency of financial reports (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).
An understanding of earnings management practices helps public 
authorities (like governments and regulators) improve functioning of financial 
markets, reduce asymmetry of information, reduce cost of capital, protect small 
and minority shareholder’s interests, promote financial stability, and lead to 
efficient allocation of capital. A regulation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
United States in 2002 is a classic example of an effort to promote more accurate 
financial reporting, standards, and accountability to company issued financial
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statements (Cohen et al., 2007). These interventions allow auditors to have a more 
consistent and precise framework for evaluating the financial statements of firms. 
In turn, both financial analysts and shareholders benefit from not only more 
accurate financial information, but more consistent financial reporting by firms. 
This applies across industries, allowing the best possible conclusions to be drawn.
Much research has been done in the past in attempts to determine levels of 
earnings management that firms indulge in by studying their financial statements. 
Various models have been developed to detect earnings management by studying 
different models of accruals. Most models in the area of earnings management 
relate to its prevalence over time or at the time of IPO issue (Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, & Rao 1998), seasoned equity offerings (Rangan, 
1998), and mergers and acquisitions (Erickson and Wang, 1999). Very little 
attempt has been made to examine whether earnings management has diminished 
after the introduction of regulations like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act2 and whether 
discretionary accmals vary over the course of business cycles3. The present study 
contributes to the literature by examining the determinants o f accruals in the US 
corporate sector for the period 1980-2010 by examining its behavior over 
different phases of business cycles using a large cohort of firms (1125 firms) 
which could provide robust results.
2 Studies of interest in firm earnings management behavioral changes before and after the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act include Graham et al., 2005; Cohen, Dey, & Lys 2007; 
and Cohen & Zarowin 2010.
3 Although much more limited, the best work on the relationship of accruals and business cycles 
was examined by Teoh, Welch, & Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, & Rao 1998; Hirshleifer et al., 2009; 
and Kang et al., 2010. Additionally, important work on stock prices and economic cycles has been 
done by Braun & Larrain 2005; Wei 2009; Covas &Den Haan 2011; and Naes et al., 2011.
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This study is organized into five chapters: Chapter II reviews the literature 
on the subject and sets the hypotheses for empirical investigation. Chapter III 
discusses the database and methodology of the study. Chapter IV presents the 
empirical results, and Chapter V summarizes the concluding observations.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
This chapter briefly reviews the literature on the subject of earnings 
management. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 briefly reviews the 
definition of and literature on earnings management, Section 2.2 discusses the 
different discretionary accruals models, and Section 2.3 summarizes the results of 
the empirical studies related to accrual-based earnings management, and develops 
hypothesis for empirical investigation.
2.1 Definition o f Earnings Management
In addition to white, gray, and black definitions of earnings management
discussed in Chapter 1, earnings management can further be classified into two
forms: (a) real earnings management and (b) accrual-based earnings management.
Real earnings management refers to ‘changes in the timing or structure of an
operating, investing, or financial activity to affect earnings’ (Edelstein et al.,
2009). From a practical point of view, this can involve changes in the timing of
product shipments, strategically timed pricing discounts, or sales of long-term
assets. All of these actions represent ‘real’ alterations in company operations with
the motivation and objective of altering a company’s quarterly or annual financial
data. A commonly studied form of real earnings management is the opportunistic
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reduction in R&D expenditure to reduce reported expenses (Rowchowdhury, 
2006, p.338). In addition, there is anecdotal evidence of managers engaging in 
providing limited time discounts to increase sales and building up excess 
inventory to lower reported cost of goods sold (ibid., p.338). Additionally, Bens et 
al., (2002, 2003) report that managers repurchase stock to avoid eamings-per- 
share dilution arising from exercising employee stock options or stock option 
grants.
Accrual-based earnings management is a more subtle and sophisticated 
method of accomplishing the same task. Through a company’s accrual accounts 
(accounts receivable, accounts payable, provisioning, etc.) management has the 
ability to manipulate their earnings to meet pre-determined targets. Accruals as 
defined in accounting are accounts on a balance sheet representing liabilities or 
non-cash assets. Because of leeway provided by accounting standards and 
practices, management has the ability to increase or decrease income by creating 
these accruals (Li et al., 2009). Discretionary accruals can be considered changes 
in the value of accruals that are based on inventory write down, alterations o f debt 
valuations, provisioning, etc. Because values in these categories have a certain 
level of subjectivity, management has the ability to alter these numbers to achieve 
pre-determined goals. Isolating the discretionary and non-discretionary portions 
of an accrual account is the most important factor in developing a good earnings 
management detection model.
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2.2 Accrual Determination Models
Many models have been developed by researchers for the estimation of 
non-discretionary and discretionary accruals components from financial 
statements of firms. The difficulty in isolating the non-discretionary and 
discretionary portions from total accruals by investigators (auditors, analysts, 
investors, and researchers) makes it an ideal mechanism for firms looking to 
engage in earnings management. One of the earliest discretionary accrual models 
is the Healy model (1985) which is discussed below:
(a) The Healy Model (1985)
The earliest discretionary accrual model was developed by Healy (1985). 
In this model, earnings management could be detected by looking at the 
deviations in the accruals from the normal (mean) level of past accruals:
A r, n  (ACAt -&CLt -b C a s h t + bST D t-D ep t ) A L K t  -  -
Where:
ACRt = total working capital accruals (total accruals). 
ACAt = change in current assets.
ACLt = change in current liabilities.
ACasht = change in cash and cash equivalents.
ASTDt = change in debt included in current liabilities. 
Dept = depreciation and amortization expense.
At-i = assets in the previous period.
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Non-discretionary accruals are given as:
NDAt = (2.2)
Where:
NDAt = non-discretionary accruals
TAt = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets
t = subscript for year included in the estimation period
T = subscript indicating a year in the event period
T= a year subscript for years included in the estimation period
The result of TA -  NDA then gives the value for discretionary accruals.
(b) The DeAngelo Model (1986)
The subsequent model by DeAngelo (1986) assumed that first order 
differences in accruals have an expected value of zero.
Therefore:
NDAt = TAt_t (2.3)
However, it is unlikely that accruals are constant over time, or dependent 
on the previous year in such a one dimensional way.
(c) The Industry Model (1991)
The industry model (Dechow and Sloan, 1991) is a further refined attempt 
to isolate discretionary accruals. Instead of directly isolating non-discretionary 
accruals to obtain discretionary accruals, the model assumes that ‘variation in the
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determinants of non-discretionary accruals is common across firms in the same 
industry’ (ibid., 1991). The Industry model for nondiscretionary accruals is:
NDAt =  Yi +  YzmediariiiTAf) (2.4)
Where:
Yi and y 2 = firms 1 and 2
median] (TAt) = the median value of total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
for all non-sample firms in the same 2-digit SIC code
(d) The Jones Model (1991)
The model by Jones (1991) used the variables of ‘firm revenues’, ‘gross 
property, plant, and equipment’, and ‘total assets’, to break down the total 
accruals values into non-discretionary and discretionary components. The original 
Jones model is given as:
e-‘(£)+*®+*‘(£r)+'»' ( 2 -5 >
Where:
TAi,= total accruals in year t for firm i
AREVit = revenues in year t minus revenues in year t-1 for firm i 
PPEjt = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i 
Ait-i = total assets in year t-1 for firm i 
£jt = error term in year t for firm i
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Non-discretionary accruals are calculated as:
NDAt =  ax )  + a 2(AREVt) + a 3(PPEt) (2.6)
The result of TA -  NDA then gives the value for discretionary accruals.
Although this model did give some predictability, it has subsequently been 
improved on and modified, most notably by Dechow et al., (1995) and Kothari et 
al., (2005).
(e) The ‘Modified’Jones Model (1995)
A major limitation of the Jones model lies in its inability to capture the 
impact of sales-based manipulation since changes in sales are assumed to give rise 
to non-discretionary accruals. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) proposed a 
modification to the standard Jones model. The ‘modified’ Jones model is identical 
to the standard Jones model, with the exception that the changes in ‘debtors’ 
(AREC) is subtracted from AREV at the second stage. In effect, the ‘modified’ 
Jones model assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period result 
from earnings management. Dechow et al., use this ‘modified’ Jones model to 
detect earnings management among firms and to test the results o f this model in 
comparison to results from the DeAngelo, Healy, Jones, and Industry models o f 
discretionary accrual calculation. Their ‘modified’ Jones model is designed to 
‘eliminate conjectured tendency of the Jones model to measure discretionary 
accruals with error when discretion is exercised over revenues’ (Dechow et al.,
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1995). The formula for non-discretionary accruals in the ‘modified’ Jones model 
is as follows:
NDAt = ax + a2(AREVt -  ARECt) + <x3(PPEt) (2.7)
Where:
NDA, = non-discretionary accruals in year t 
At_i = total assets in year t-1
AREVt = net revenues in year t less net revenues in year t-1 scaled by total assets 
at t-1
ARECt = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 scaled by total 
assets at t-1
PPEt = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t
The above formula (equation 2.7) ‘implicitly assumes that all changes in 
credit sales in the event period result from earnings management’ (Dechow et al., 
1995). As in the earlier versions non-discretionary accruals are subtracted from 
the total accruals value to derive the discretionary accruals value. This formula 
has become the most widely used in empirical literature and gives the best 
predictability in discretionary accruals based earnings management detection 
(Kothari et al., 2005).
(j) The Kothari ‘Modified’ Jones Model (2005)
A significant contribution to the work on derivation of discretionary 
accruals was done by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). Kothari et al., (2005)
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created a ‘performance-matched’ discretionary accruals formula which involved 
derivation of a control sample of firms that are assumed to have a ‘mean’ level o f 
earnings management. Against this benchmark, individual firms were compared 
to derive ‘abnormal’ earnings management, with managing earnings at a rate 
higher or lower than the control sample (Kothari et al., 2005, p. 165). The authors 
find that the ‘modified’ Jones model continues to be the one with the greatest 
ability to detect earnings management, but they augment the existing ‘modified’ 
Jones model with the addition of the variables of current return on assets (ROAt) 
and past return on assets (ROAt-i)- The rationale for this addition to the equation 
is that ‘earnings deflated by assets equals return on assets, which measures 
performance, and prior research analyzing long-run abnormal stock return 
performance and abnormal operating performance finds matching on ROA is 
better specified and more powerfully tests compared to other matching variables’ 
(Kothari et al., 2005, p. 169). The authors also found that for their regressions the 
firm ‘matching’ technique used by Teoh et al.,(1998) provides a better result 
compared with the industry matching technique. Kothari et al. argue believe that 
firms of similar size and industry are likely to have similar non-discretionary 
accrual amounts, and argue that discretionary accruals for any firm arise from 
three causes:
1) Accruals related to the ‘treatment’ event (eg. A seasoned equity offering).
2) Accruals related from incentives (eg. Employee bonuses, meeting 
analyst’s expectations).
3) Accruals correlated with performance.
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Kothari et al., argue that the firm being tested and the control (matching) 
firm are likely to have similar values for the second and third causes, as they are 
of similar size and industry. Therefore, Kothari et al., are able to isolate the 
earnings management that is directly correlated to the ‘treatment’ event (Kothari 
et al., 2005, p. 171). The authors create a new version of the ‘modified’ Jones 
equation using the ROA for periods t and t-1:
Where:
TAit = total accruals in year t for firm i
Ajt-i = total assets in year t-1 for firm i
ASALESit = change in sales in year t for firm i
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i
ROAjt(orit-i) = return on assets in time t or t-1 for firm i
Vit = the residual
Kothari et al., (2005) found in their empirical investigations that the
‘matching’ technique yielded better results, and that their alteration of the
‘modified’ Jones model yielded lower chance of misspecification than the original 
‘modified’ Jones model. The design of the ‘modified’ Jones model, assumed that 
all credit sales represent accrual manipulation, although this is unlikely to be the 
case all the time (Kothari et al., 2005, p. 186). The authors conclude that the Jones
14
A L E S ^  + a 3(PPElt) + u ^ R O A ^o r  it-^)
(2 .8)
and ‘modified’ Jones models suffer from ‘severe misspecification in stratified 
random samples’ (Kothari et al., 2005, p. 186). When there are negative 
discretionary accruals, there is an over-rejection of the null hypothesis, and when 
there are positive discretionary accruals, there is an under-rejection of the null 
hypothesis. They admit that their modification of the formula does have its own 
misspecification problems, but that it is a viable alternative to the existing reliance 
on the ‘modified’ Jones formula for earnings management detection.
In summary, the accrual-based earnings management models discussed 
above have relied on a number of firm-specific variables in the attempt to 
estimate accurate accruals and non-discretionary accruals. Table 2.1 presents a 
summary of the various accrual models used in the earnings management 
literature. In a survey of five commonly used models of discretionary accruals, 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) conclude that the ‘modified’ Jones model 
works best. Moreover, the results of all the five models are fairly similar. 
Therefore, in our empirical investigation (presented in Chapter IV), we use the 
‘modified’ Jones model (equation 2.7) for estimating discretionary accruals.
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Table 2.1 Discretionary Accrual Proxies
Panel A: Aggregate accrual proxy
Authors Discretionary accrual proxy
Healy (1985)
DeAngelo (1986)
Jones(1991)
Modified Jones Model from Dechow et al., (1995) 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995)
Total accruals 
Change in total accruals
Residual fiom regression o f total accruals on change 
in sales and property, plant and equipment
Residual from regression o f total accruals on change 
in sales and property, plant and equipment, where 
revenue is adjusted for change in receivables in the 
event period
Residual from a regression o f  noncash current assets 
less liabilities on lagged levels o f these balances, 
adjusted for increases in revenues, expenses and 
plant and equipment
Panel B: Specific accrual models
Authors Discretionary accrual proxy
McNichols and Wilson (1988)
Petroni (1992)
Beaver and Engel (1996)
Beneish (1997)
Beaver and McNichols (1998)
Residual provision for bad debt, estimated as the 
residual from a regression of the provision for bad 
debts on the allowance beginning balance, and 
current and future write-offs
Claim loss reserve estimation error, measured as the 
five year development of loss reserves of property 
casualty insurers
Residual allowance for loan losses, estimated as the 
residual from a regression o f the allowance for loan 
losses on net charge-offs, loan outstanding, 
nonperforming assets and one year ahead change in 
nonperforming assets
Days in receivables index, gross margin index, asset 
quality index, depreciation index, selling general and 
administrative expense index, total accruals to total 
assets index
Serial correlation of one year development o f loss 
reserves o f property casualty insurers
Panel C: Frequency distribution approach
Authors Test for earnings management
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
Degeorge et al. (1999)
Myers and Skinner (1999)
Test whether the frequency o f annual earnings 
realizations in the region above (below) zero earnings 
and last year’s earnings is greater (less) than 
expected
Test whether the frequency o f  quarterly earnings 
realizations in the region above (below) zero 
earnings, last quarter’s earnings and analysts’ 
forecasts is greater (less) than expected
Test whether the number of consecutive earnings 
increase is greater than expected absent earnings 
management
Source: McNichols (2000), p. 317.
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2.3 Empirical Studies o f Earnings Management
The creation and refinement of the above mentioned models to isolate the 
discretionary portion of firm total accruals data has led to a substantial amount of 
empirical research. Application o f these models to different aspects o f finance has 
been researched with the objective of identifying firms who actively engage in 
accruals based earnings management. The empirical literature can be broadly 
classified as (a) earnings management and stock price, (b) earnings management 
and seasoned equity offerings, (c) earnings management and initial public 
offerings, (d) earnings management and cumulative abnormal returns, (e) earnings 
management and mergers, and (f) earnings management and banks.
(a) Earnings Management and Stock Price
As the ‘modified’ Jones formula for discretionary accruals determination 
became widespread, K.R. Subramanyam’s (1996) study attempted published a 
paper to determine if discretionary accrual values of firms impacted firm’s stock 
prices. Using the ‘modified’ Jones formula, Subramanyam’s study of US firms 
using the CRSP database o f 2808 firms over a 20 firm-years period found that 
discretionary accruals were an important variable in future predictability of stock 
prices across many industries, and the inclusion of discretionary accruals 
‘improved the ability of firm income to explain future profitability’ 
(Subramanyam, 1996, p.273). With regard to earnings management, the author 
also found that there was ‘evidence of pervasive income smoothing that improves 
the persistence and predictability of earnings’ (Subramanyam, 1996, p.273).
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Subramanyam’s (1996) paper was one of the first to show that earnings 
management had an active role in the modification of discretionary accrual values 
for the purposes of income smoothing.
(b) Earnings Management and Seasoned Equity Offerings
A study by Srinivasan Rangan (1998) tested the discretionary accrual 
values of firms (using the ‘modified’ Jones model) during the period surrounding 
a seasoned equity offering (non-IPO). Specifically, discretionary accrual values 
were tested in the years t-1, t, and t+1 surrounding an equity offering by an 
established firm. Using quarterly data for the US, Rangan (1998) found that there 
was reliable predictability in the stock price o f firms. Using data for 230 
established firms over a four year period (1987-1990), Rangan (1998) found that 
‘a one-standard-deviation increase in earnings management (discretionary 
accruals) during the year before the equity offering resulted with a decline in 
market-adjusted returns in the year following the seasoned equity offering of 
about 10%’ (Rangan, 1998, p. 102). Rangan (1998) also found that earnings 
management was most common in the quarter in which the equity offering was 
announced and the quarter following the announcement.
(c) Earnings Management and IPO’s (Initial Public Offerings)
Empirical studies on earnings management have generally found it to be 
more prevalent in the event of initial public offerings (IPO’s). Altering the 
financials of a firm and therefore manipulating the expectations and consensus of 
stakeholders and analysts in the lead up to an IPO can have significant positive
18
effects on the stock price at the time of offering. There has been substantial 
research showing the existence of earnings management (both accrual-based and 
real) in the lead-up to IPO’s (Teoh, Welch, & Wong 1998; Teoh, Wong, & Rao 
1999; DuCharme et al., 2001).
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) further discuss evidence of discretionary 
accruals management and income smoothing for companies during IPO’s. The 
authors found that companies who had high earnings management (highest 
quartile) at the time of the IPO, had in the third year after the IPO (t+3) an 
average stock price of 20% less than companies in the lowest quartile of earnings 
management. Companies with high earnings management at the time of the IPO 
also had 20% less seasoned equity offerings in the 5-year period following the 
IPO (Teoh, Welch, & Wong 1998, p. 1935). In their study they used data for 
1,974 IPO’s from the 1980-1984 periods, and a further 3,197 IPO’s for the 1985- 
1992 periods, using data from the CRSP database (ibid., p. 1942). With 
alternative measures of abnormal returns, benchmarks, cumulation periods, 
sample partitions, and regression test specifications (cross-sectional, time-series, 
Fama-MacBeth) the authors found that ‘discretionary current accruals reliably 
predict post-IPO returns’ (ibid., p. 1949).
A subsequent paper published by Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) compared 
‘abnormal’ accruals of firms in the year o f their IPO. ‘Abnormal’ accruals were 
calculated as accruals above the benchmark for firms of similar industry and size. 
Because there is an incentive for firms to seek a boost in earnings before their 
initial public offering, the authors found that financial statements of the firms
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showed ‘unusually high positive accruals’ (Teoh, Wong, & Rao 1998, p. 176). 
The authors also found that ‘firms with unusually high accruals in the IPO year 
consistently had low post-IPO earnings, and that high IPO accrual levels predicted 
low post-EPO earnings compared to industry benchmarks’ (ibid., p. 176). In their 
sample, the authors used 1,682 IPO’s between 1980 and 1990. For companies to 
qualify, they had to have an IPO stock price o f <$1.00, gross proceeds of 
>$1,000,000, only common stock offered, and the offering handled by an 
investment bank. Data was gathered from the Compustat database. In the 
calculation of abnormal accruals, the authors compared the firm accruals across 
industry benchmarks, and used the ‘modified’ Jones method of accruals 
calculation. One interesting technique that the authors used in their paper was an 
alternative system of capturing abnormal accruals. Because IPO firms are likely to 
have extreme performance compared to the overall industry, many of the IPO 
firm financial values will be outliers compared to the industry. To properly 
capture abnormal accruals o f EPO firms, the authors matched each IPO firm with a 
firm in the same industry and of the same size, but which was not having an IPO. 
The authors state that this ‘matching’ technique is beneficial as ‘systematic errors 
in the Jones model abnormal accruals for similar performing firms are eliminated’ 
(ibid., p. 183). The authors do note, however, that accruals information can be 
underestimated, as there still may be motivation for the non-IPO-issuing matching 
firm to engage in earnings management themselves for reasons of their own. In 
their results, the authors found that there were inferior returns for IPO firms in the 
years following the IPO. Compared both to industry benchmarks and the
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‘matching firm’, the IPO firms underperformed in years t through t+6 of the IPO. 
It is of interest that the underperformance was worse for the IPO firms when using 
the ‘matching firm’ technique. In their summary, the authors claim that ‘abnormal 
current accruals has the greatest consistent explanatory power among all the 
proxies, perhaps because it is the component most easily subject to successful 
managerial manipulation’ (ibid., p. 195). In general, evidence suggests that firms 
in the lead up to their IPO have significant negative abnormal cash flows and 
manipulate accmals to inflate reported earnings (Bao et al., 2012). In addition, it 
has been shown that decisions to manipulate earnings in the lead-up to an IPO are 
positively related to IPO proceeds, and negatively related to analyst reputation 
ranking (Bao et al., 2012).
(d) Earnings Management and CAR’s (Cumulative Abnormal Returnsj
In a recent paper Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2009) examined whether 
accmals contained information about the discount rate, or whether firms managed 
earnings in response to market under or overvaluation. The authors used the 
CRSP value-weighted market index for their data, over the period 1965-2005. 
Similar to Kang et al., (2010), they found that firms with high accmals but low 
cash flows were consistently overvalued, and suffered from low future cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR’s). Similarly, they found that firms with low accrual 
levels but high cash flows were consistently undervalued by the markets, and 
enjoyed high future CAR’s. They felt that the cash flows at the firm level should 
be dissected into cash and accmal components to give the best picture of the 
actual firm’s status (Hirshleifer et al., 2009, p. 390). The authors also found that at
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the aggregate level, a one-standard-deviation increase in accruals in time t led to a 
7% increase in the stock price in time t+1. They also found that high aggregate 
cash flow levels negatively affected stock prices in the aggregate. Like Kang et 
al., (2010), the authors found that the ‘lean against the wind’ hypothesis was also 
a valid explanation of their findings. If firms become undervalued, they will be 
especially eager to report higher earnings by increasing accruals relative to their 
cash flows (Hirshleifer et al., 2009, p. 405). However, the authors note that some 
explanation must be made as to why firms are prone to this ‘leaning’ effect more 
often during aggregate (industry or market) undervaluation rather than simply 
firm-specific undervaluation.
Related to Hirshleifer et al., (2009), one of the most telling papers related 
to accruals-based earnings management detection is ‘Predicting stock market 
returns with aggregate discretionary accruals’ by Kang, Liu, and Qi (2010). 
Published shortly after Hirshleifer et al., (2009), the authors make more direct 
conclusions than the Hirshleifer et al., paper. They find that on the aggregate, 
discretionary accruals contain little information about overall firm business 
conditions compared to normal non-discretionary accruals, but ‘aggregate 
(industry or market) accrual levels reflect aggregate fluctuations in earnings 
management, thereby favoring the behavioral explanation that managers time 
aggregate equity markets to report earnings’ (Kang et al., 2010, p. 815). The 
authors begin with the premise that a change in accmals in the aggregate 
represents either a change in the discount rate, or the fact that firms are managing 
earnings in response to market undervaluation. They found that aggregate
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accruals can positively predict aggregate stock returns. They also found using the 
‘modified’ Jones formula that the forecasting power was entirely driven by 
discretionary accruals (as opposed to total or non-discretionary accruals). Non- 
discretionary accruals provided no predictive power whatsoever, while 
discretionary accruals provided very robust results. The authors did add that there 
is a misspecification problem that exists as the ‘modified’ Jones accrual formula 
fails to take into account business cycles. They also noted that non-discretionary 
accrual levels correlated with the rate of GDP growth. Additionally, discretionary 
accruals tended to have no correlation with any other macroeconomic variables. 
The authors were able to completely rule out the argument that discretionary 
accrual amounts were based on changes in the discount rate. They limited the 
causes of changes in discretionary accrual amounts to be based on manager’s 
decisions to ‘lean against the wind’ in the form of managing earnings based on 
market timing. Managers also responded to decreases in equity market firm 
valuations by the adjusting up of current period accruals, and vice versa during 
times of increased firm valuations.
Kang et al., used three different regressions in deriving their results. The 
first was the standard ‘modified’ Jones model with all firms included. The second 
was the same, but with the deletion of firms experiencing ‘extreme events’. In the 
third regression they used the Kothari version of the ‘modified’ Jones formula. 
They used the CRSP database to obtain data for 2,450 US firms over the period 
1965-2004. Any firm with less than ten data points was omitted.
23
Interestingly, the authors speculated that in the face of reputation damage 
or litigation, managers will manage earnings based on the aggregate market level 
rather than their own firm’s individual stock price. In addition, they found that 
aggregate level discretionary accruals showed a stronger ability to predict firm- 
level returns than firm-level discretionary accrual values did. Predictability also 
increased in power when the target firm was of a larger size. The authors 
speculated this was because the managers of very large firms have ‘more at stake’ 
(Kang et al., 2010, p. 820).
(e) Earnings Management and Mergers
The study Erickson and Wang (1999) examined earnings management by 
acquiring firms when using their own stock during a merger. In these mergers, 
stock of the acquiring firm is used as payment. There is an agreed upon price 
between the acquiring and target firms, and that price is paid by the equity (stock) 
of the acquiring firm. Logic follows that if the acquiring firm can increase the 
price of their stock by some means (including earnings management) they will be 
able to obtain the target firm for a lower ‘real’ price (lower acquiring-firm number 
of shares) than if acquiring-firm stock was valued at a lower price without 
earnings management. The authors also believe that this artificial stock price 
inflation is in the interest of the existing acquiring-firm shareholders because 
‘existing shareholders prefer a higher price to minimize the likelihood of earnings 
dilution, and secondly a stock issue dilutes voting power and control of existing 
shareholders’ (Erickson & Wang, 1999, p. 150).
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To analyze the hypothesis, the authors looked at 55 acquiring firms who 
used stock for a merger between 1985 and 1990. They used the Kothari version of 
the ‘modified’ Jones model for their analysis, but scaled all variables by total 
assets of the firm:
i l r=  e°(jk) + * ( ^ f ) + ....+ &<?.+
# 7*85 + .......+ #1 2*9 0 + £it (2-9)
Where:
TTACjt = Total accmals of firm i in time t
ASTjt = Total assets of firm i in time t
AREVjt = Change in revenue for firm i in time t
PPEjt= Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in time t
q , _  Q k = Quarterly variable taking a value of 1 for quarters 1-4 of the fiscal year, 
and 0 otherwise
Y85 -  Y90 = A year indicator variable taking the value of 1 for 1985-1990 and 0 
otherwise
Regressions by Erickson and Wang showed that there was consistent 
earnings management on the part of the acquiring firm, and this earnings 
management was ‘based on an increasing function of the economic benefits at 
stake in the merger by relative deal size’ (Erickson & Wang, 1999, p. 151). The 
authors also studied competing firms who had completed mergers of similar scale 
during the same time frame, but used only cash to acquire the target firm. They
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found in that case that there was ‘no evidence of pre-merger earnings 
management by these firms’ (ibid., p. 151).
Over twenty years of articles related to earnings management using 
discretionary accruals has led to an almost complete consensus on the use of the 
‘modified’ Jones version when attempting to calculate discretionary accruals. 
That being the case, there has been some criticism as to the ‘modified’ Jones 
models ability to accurately separate discretionary accruals from non- 
discretionary accruals. There is also criticism as to whether discretionary accruals 
data is the most important or reliable means of detecting earnings management.
An article by Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) examines the expansion in 
the 1990’s of many scholarly accounting techniques and critiques their relevance, 
their actual advancement of accounting literature, and their applicability and 
predictability in the real world. Although the paper looks at many techniques used 
for firm analysis, they devote a section of the paper to the current state of affairs 
in discretionary accrual analysis. The authors cite an article published by Kang 
and Sivaramakrishnan who use an ‘instrumental variables’ approach to 
discretionary accrual detection, and show that their model performs better than the 
benchmark ‘modified’ Jones model (Fields et al., 2001, p.289). The authors 
believed that three approaches were open to future scholarly papers regarding 
detection of earnings management:
1) The continued use of discretionary accruals in earnings management
detection
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2) The development of more powerful techniques, like those developed by 
Kang & Sivaramakrishnan
3) To ‘return to the basics’ and use accounting expertise to directly measure 
accounting choice via financial statements
(Fields et al., 2001, p.290)
The study by Kang and Sivaramakrishnan proposes an alternate method of 
discretional accrual calculation, as they feel that the existing ‘modified’ Jones 
model causes ‘simultaneity, errors-in-variables, or omitted variable problems, any 
of which leads to reduced statistical power and erroneous inferences regarding 
earnings management’ (Kang & Sivaramakrishnan, 1995, p. 354).
The authors create a model based on instrumental variables (IV) method, 
and measure the results against the ‘modified’ Jones model, and also measure the 
amount of Type I and II errors versus ‘modified’ Jones. Using the GMM 
regression technique (generalized method of moments) they find that their model 
is superior to the ‘modified’ Jones model in discretionary accrual detection, and 
also has less Type I errors. In the conclusion of the paper, the authors state that 
there is great opportunity to further develop the model by creating more specific 
variables than those used in their paper depending on what future scholars wish to 
capture with their analysis. In addition, the GMM technique allows lagged or 
double lagged variables to be added to the model without any need to change the 
model itself. Although this model appears to show improvement in discretionary 
accmals detection, there seems to be no real expansion of this model in other 
scholarly work.
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(f) Earnings Management and Banks
Like all other firms, earnings management in the form o f income 
smoothing improves the risk perception of a bank to its investors, analysts, and 
regulators. It maintains a steady compensation to managers regardless o f their 
actual competency. In addition, bank failures, declining earnings, deposit flights 
to mutual funds, erosion of reserves, hostile takeovers, tightened regulations, and 
pressures from boards of directors significantly increase the pressures on banks to 
smooth their incomes (Bhat, 1996, p.505). Unlike firms from other industries, 
banks earn a large proportion of their income from loans. Therefore, a significant 
portion of risk regarding earnings comes from loans. During the 1990’s in the 
United States there was significant evidence that banks were under-reporting or 
over-reporting their loan book sizes, and ‘maintaining significant amounts of 
unsupported reserves ... not clearly linked to likely losses’ (Liu & Ryan, 2006). 
The difference in reported book values of loans and actual book values, as well as 
the value of loans that are ‘written o ff  and the actual value that are ‘written o ff  
can be determined by managers. Likewise, the size of reserves that they must 
keep on hand to cover these ‘written o ff  loans can likewise be determined by 
management’s discretion. Prior literature on management of provision for loan 
losses states that in good times banks have an incentive to decrease income, and 
increase income in bad times. In addition, provisions can be managed for the 
purposes of managerial compensation (Liu & Ryan, 2006, p.424). Accrual-based 
earnings management is likely as prevalent in this industry as in any other, but
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because of the significantly different accounting reporting standards in the 
financial industry (Teoh & Wong, 2002, p. 873) the inclusion o f the banking 
sector has not been included in the scope o f this paper.
2.4 Hypothesis Development
Dechow et al., (1995) and Kasznik (1999) both describe how discretionary 
accruals estimated from the Jones base model or the ‘modified’ Jones model 
variation are both positively related to return on assets. This positive correlation 
has been accredited to the misspecification inherent in these two models, with the 
assumption that there is no relationship between earnings management and firm 
performance or growth (Jevons Lee et al., 2006, p. 306). Additionally, managers 
choose the level of reported earnings to maximize their utility, which is an 
increasing function of the firm’s market value. This leads to our first hypothesis:
Hi: Earnings management and return on assets (RoA) are positively related.
Earnings management is related to firm characteristics like size, leverage, 
etc. It also makes practical sense that highly leveraged firms would have a greater 
impetus to meet or exceed their industry peers as well as analyst predictions when 
it comes to earnings reporting. Any substantial drop in their share price would 
have serious negative effects on their debt-to-equity ratio, as it would increase in 
the event of a lowering of their stock price. Consequentially, an increase in the 
debt-to-equity ratio could erode investor confidence in the firm’s ability to 
manage payments on the higher leverage ratio. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
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H2: Earnings management and firm leverage are positively related.
Large firms are more closely monitored by investors (especially 
institutional investors) and analysts. There are incentives to step-up earnings 
reports. Specifically, managers of large companies have greater amounts of 
compensation at risk, as well as personal prestige and reputation. Because of this 
they have a greater incentive to indulge in earnings management than managers of 
smaller firms (Kim et al., 2003), especially for the purposes o f avoiding reports o f 
earnings decreases and potentially putting their compensation at risk. This leads to 
the following hypothesis:
H3 : Earnings management and firm size (TA) are positively related.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a federal law that set enhanced standards for 
all US public company boards, management, and public accounting firms (Kieso 
et al., 2005). With the passage of this act, management must now individually 
certify the accuracy of financial information and penalties for fraudulent financial 
activity are much more severe. The act also increased the independence of outside 
auditors who review corporate financial statements, and increased the oversight of 
boards of directors. Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
managers were able to manage earnings with a lower chance of detection. 
Compared to industry peers, earnings shortfalls were rare and when they did 
occur the market interpretation of the earnings shortfall was substantial. Cohen et 
al., (2007) present findings that after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the
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amount of accrual-based earnings management was attenuated. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:
H4 : The amount of accrual-based earnings management will be smaller after 
the implementation of heightened financial regulation (SOX) compared to 
before the passage of the increased financial regulation.
Utilizing the train of thought of Barberis et al., (1998) and Veronesi 
(1999) during expansionary economic phases investors will become highly 
confident that the market is in a good state. Under such circumstances, firm- 
specific bad news causes firm stock prices to fall, since bad news causes poor 
investor sentiment that the firm is in a good state in relation to the industry as a 
whole. Additionally, as uncertainty in the true state of the economy increases, 
risk-averse investors ask for a higher expected return (greater firm earnings). In 
times of economic uncertainty a further asymmetry is caused in investor response 
to bad news. When investors believe that the economy is in a bad state, additional 
bad news will have minimal impact on an investor’s firm-specific sentiment, as 
they cannot separate the firm specific event from overall macroeconomic 
uncertainty. There is therefore a motivation for firms to maintain their earnings at 
levels similar to their industry peers during good times, and report lower-than- 
actual amounts during bad times. This leads to hypothesis five:
H5 : Positive earnings management and business cycles are positively related.
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2.4 Earnings Management, Reversals and Recent Developments
The most recent development in earnings management literature is related 
to accrual reversals. The study by Baber, Kang, and Li (2011) examine accrual 
‘reversals’ which is based on the argument that any positive or negative 
discretionary accruals that are created for the purposes of earnings management 
must be reversed in future financial reporting, as they must be ‘paid back’. With 
this assumption Baber et al., (2011) examine not only absolute accrual values as 
in the ‘modified’ Jones model, but also examine changes in discretionary accrual 
values between different time periods. The differences in these values are referred 
to as ‘net’ discretionary accruals, and Baber et al., (2011) propose that these are 
the true indicators for determining companies’ levels of earnings management. 
With the addition of these net discretionary accruals to the ‘modified’ Jones 
model, the authors have created a test that has more robust results than traditional 
regression modeling (cross section and time series), and also has little 
specification problem that has been inherent to discretionary accruals modeling 
empirical discourse.
In the study of these reversals, Baber et al., point out that there is an 
inverse association between the reversal speed and the probability o f meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts (Baber et al., 2011, p.l 191). The reversal speed refers to 
the length of time that a discretionary accrual can exist ‘on the books’ before it 
must be paid back. The authors also note that since the introduction of Sarbanes- 
Oxley regulation there has been a reduction in discretionary accruals-based
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earnings management (ibid., p. 1190). The framing o f reversals is given as the 
following:
Xt = X*t + (d?ew -  ^v ersed ) (2 .10)
Where:
Xt = reported earnings 
Xt* = unmanged earnings 
dtnew= new discretionary accruals
r^eversed _ prevjous discretionary accruals that reverse in time t 
(dtnew -  dtrcversed) therefore gives the ‘net’ discretionary accrual for t
The authors state the proxies for reversals are the residual autocorrelation 
coefficients. Given discretionary accruals for a firm, the order of autocorrelation 
of residuals that is the smallest is equal to the period of full reversal (ibid., 
p. 1195). The isolation of net non-current discretionary accruals is given through 
the following formula:
Where:
ACC -NCt = the difference in working capital accounts (ACC_WCt) and total
ACC — ——  — /?o t + P i t  ^
ASALES,
(2 .11)
accruals (ACCt>
ASALESjt= change in sales in year t
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t
et = net non-current discretionary accruals
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Faster reversal speed of prior discretionary accruals imposes greater 
constraints on management’s ability to undertake subsequent earnings 
management. In addition, a given amount of net discretionary accrual 
overstatement imposes ‘different degrees of constraint on subsequent earnings 
management depending on the reversal speed of discretionary accruals’ (ibid., 
p. 1209).
The most recent study integrating net discretionary accrual and reversals is 
by Dechow, Hutton, Kim, and Sloan (2012). Working under similar equations to 
Baber et al., (equation 2.10), the authors describe in detail why the addition of 
reversals in current discretionary accmals calculation improves the current 
formula. Specifically, they find that reversals ‘increase test power by 40% and 
mitigate misspecification problems from correlated omitted variables’ (Dechow et 
al., 2012, p.2).
In their testing, the authors create a sample from 1950-2009, for a total of 
209,530 firm years. They omit financial firms, as discretionary accmals 
calculation is based on working capital, and this variable is of less meaning to 
financial firms (ibid., p. 15). In their tests, they find that if the researcher models 
reversals when they do not actually exist, the test power decreases. However, if 
they are right about the timing of reversals 50% of the time, test power increases, 
and if their timing is as right for reversals as it is for the timing of earnings 
management, predictive power is increased by >50% compared to traditional t- 
tests. In addition, they find that the best results come from modeling reversals as 
occurring in t+1 and t+2 periods (ibid., p.26).
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To overcome misspecification, the authors find the correlated omitted 
variable bias ‘is overcome by reversals as long as the omitted variables don’t 
reverse in the same period as the discretionary accruals’ (ibid., p.30). They find 
that modeling reversals in any period >t+2 causes over-correction. As opposed to 
Kothari et al., the authors also find that firm performance matching does not work 
well, as omitted variables cannot be known.
The examination of earnings management to date has been extensive. 
Developments in modeling discretionary accrual isolation (using various models) 
have evolved, and studies involving the application of these models are 
substantial. Most of the studies are based on the ‘modified’ Jones model and these 
have shown that there exists substantial earnings management, especially in the 
United States. The majority of studies focus on discretionary accruals and their 
relationship to initial public offerings, seasoned stock offerings, firm returns, 
cumulative abnormal returns, mergers, and the effectiveness o f regulations (like 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter discusses the database and methodology used in the empirical 
investigation. This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 3.1 discusses the 
database used in the study and Section 3.2 discusses the methodology used in the 
study.
3.1 Database
In order to capture the overall picture o f the US corporate sector, we 
started the investigation with all firms in the S&P 1500 in 2010. Data was 
obtained from the CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices) database. 
Using the S&P 1500 index, all relevant financial variables required to calculate 
discretionary accruals values using the ‘modified’ Jones formula were obtained 
for the panel 2000-2010. Using SIC (Standard Industry Classification) codes, the 
6000 series of companies were removed from the panel, as their financial 
dynamics are quite different from non-financial firms (Dechow et al. 2012). The 
residual panel data set contained 1125 of the original S&P 1500 companies for the 
periods 2000-2010.
Regressions were completed using a balanced panel, which was composed 
of data from the 2000-2010 periods. The list of variables used in both the 
‘modified’ Jones model of discretionary accrual calculation and the empirical 
investigation are provided in Table 3.1
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To derive values for the business cycle dummy variable data was obtained 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Quarterly economic 
data was obtained for the time period 2000-1010 for the United States. Any years 
in this period with one or more quarters of economic contraction were given a 
value of zero. Years having economic expansion in all four quarters were given a 
value of one.
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Table 3.1 Description of Variables Used in the Study
Notation Definition Description
DA Discretionary accruals Discretionary accrual 
values as determined by 
‘modified’ Jones
NDA Non-discretionary
accruals
Non-discretionary 
accruals as determined by 
‘modified’ Jones
AREV Net revenues Net revenues in year t 
less net revenues in year 
t-1 scaled by total assets 
att-1
AREC Net receivables Net receivables in year t 
less net receivables in 
year t-1 scaled by total 
assets at t-1
PPE Property, plant, and 
equipment
Gross property, plant, and 
equipment in year t
SOX Dummy Variable 1 Dummy variable with the 
value o f zero before the 
introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(1980-2001) and a value 
of one after (2002-2010)
BUS_CYC Dummy Variable 2 Dummy variable with the 
value of zero in periods 
of economic peak to 
trough, and one in periods 
of trough to peak
ROA Return on assets Earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by total 
assets o f the firm
TOTAL ASSETS Total assets Total assets o f the firm
LEV Leverage Debt to equity ratio of the 
firm
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3.2 Methodology
Equation 2.7 was estimated using a panel regression framework. From this 
regression non-discretionary values were obtained for the S&P 1500 using the 
‘modified’ Jones model:
These values were then subtracted from given total accrual values for the 
matching year, and discretionary accrual amounts were obtained for each firm.
With these discretionary accrual values, an equation was estimated of the 
following form:
DAit =  p0 + piROAit + (S2TOTAL_ASSETSit +  p3LEVit + p4S0X it +
The details of data and their description are reported in Table 3.1. In terms 
of empirical methodological frameworks, we present estimates based on pooled 
least squares, fixed effects model, and random effects model. It should be noted 
that each model comes with its own shortcomings.
Fixed effects estimation assumes that the firm-specific effects are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variation of any individual variable from all 
past, current, and future time periods. Assuming that the changes in the firm-
+  a 2(AREVt -  ARECt) + a 3(PPEt)
psECON_CYCit + eit
Where:
P i -> ■>  0>/?3 >  0 ,/?4 <  0,/?5 >  0
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specific portion of these variables is constant over time, the fixed effects model 
will attribute changes in the dependent variable to influences other than these 
‘fixed’ components (Stock & Watson, 2011, p. 372). Unfortunately, this type of 
regression comes with the inherent problem that it is unlikely that all the 
unobserved variation that affects the dependent variable is static over time. From 
a practical perspective in this study, the unbalanced panel data set contains 
observations over a 30 year time period, and it is impossible that all o f the 
unobserved variation in the regression had no effect on the dependent variable 
(discretionary accruals).
The random effects model also attempts to eliminate a portion of variation 
from the model, but in this case assumes that the individual firm variables are 
constant over time, all of the variation is attributed to changes over time. Because 
time contingent variation is important for this form of regression, the constant is 
excluded as it exhibits no change over time periods. Although this model can also 
be helpful in identifying the portion of change that is purely a function of changes 
in time (and perhaps the phase of the macroeconomic cycle), it will also not be 
able to identify all of the variation alone. It is also worth noting that both the fixed 
and random effects models are inferior if the panel data set contains many outliers 
(extreme values) (Stock & Watson, 2011, p. 361).
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the panel regressions of 
determinants of discretionary accruals of 1125 US firms for the period 2000-2010. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 discusses the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the empirical investigation. Section 4.2 provides 
the correlation matrix of these variables. Section 4.3 discusses the empirical 
results of the pooled least squares, random effects, and fixed effects regression 
models. Section 4.4 summarizes the conclusions of this chapter.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
empirical investigation. The average firm size for this period was US$7.25 billion 
with the largest firm having a value of US$ 797.76 billion and the smallest having 
a value of US$ 2.62 million. The median size was US$ 1.41 billion which 
indicates that there is a substantial variation in the data. The average debt-to- 
equity ratio for this period was 50%, with the highest leveraged firm having a 
ratio of 354% and the lowest leveraged ratio being -76%. The mean discretionary 
accruals value (as a percentage o f total accruals) is 2% of total accruals per year, 
with the highest discretionary accruals percentage being 16.37% of total accruals, 
and the lowest being -10.82%. Return on assets, as measured by earnings before 
interest and taxes divided by total assets, had a mean value of 9%. The highest
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return on assets was 488%, and the lowest was -569%. The economy of the 
United States was in a state of expansion for 64% of the periods included in the 
panel, as determined by BUS_CYC, a dummy variable with a value of 0 during 
any year with at least one quarter of recessionary activity, and 1 otherwise.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Parameters of US Non-Financial 
Corporate Sector 2000-2010 (Balanced).
This table presents the variables fo r  the analysis o f  measuring the relationship o f  
discretionary accruals to a number o f firm-specific, regulatory, and business 
cycle based variables. The variable DA is defined as discretionary accrual 
amounts as a percentage o f total assets calculated using the ‘modified’ Jones 
model. SOX refers to the introduction o f the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. BUS CYC states 
whether the economy is in an expansionary or contractionary phase. ROA is 
defined as firm earnings before taxes and interest divided by total assets. TOTAL 
ASSETS refers to firm total assets in millions. LEV is defined as firm  debt-to- 
equity ratio in percentage (See Table 3.1 fo r  descriptions). Note: Data relates to 
1125 firms fo r  the period 2000-2010.
DA(% 
of total 
accruals)
SOX BUS
CYC
ROA
(%)
TOTAL 
ASSETS 
(in billions)
LEV (%)
Mean 0.02 0.83 0.67 9.01 7.26 45.44
Median -0.02 1.00 1.00 9.35 1.41 47.92
S. Dev 0.29 0.37 0.47 18.59 27.55 22.89
Skewness 9.15 -1.79 -0.71 -6.73 16.08 48.35
Minimum -10.82 0.00 0.00 -569.62 0.0026 0
Maximum 16.37 1.00 1.00 487.47 797.77 354.27
4.2 Correlation Matrix
None of the variables in the correlation matrix are highly correlated, either 
positively or negatively. This shows that there is very little chance of 
multicollinearity occurring in panel regression. In the next section, we present the 
results of the empirical investigation of equation 2.1.
42
Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix of Variables, Balanced Panel
This table presents the correlation o f the variables used in the analysis o f  the 
relationship o f discretionary accruals to a number o f firm-specific, regulatory, 
and business cycle based variables. The variable DA is defined as discretionary 
accrual amounts as a percentage o f  total assets calculated using the ‘modified’ 
Jones model. SOX refers to the introduction o f the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. BUS CYC 
states whether the economy is in an expansionary or contractionary phase. ROA 
is defined as firm earnings before taxes and interest divided by total assets. 
TOTAL ASSETS refers to firm total assets in millions. LEV is defined as firm  
debt-to-equity ratio in percentage (See Table 3.1 fo r  descriptions). Note: Data 
relates to 1125 firms for the period 2000-2010.
DA SOX ECON
CYC
ROA TOTAL
ASSETS
LEV A
REC
A PPE 
REV
DA 1
SOX 0.10
(0.00)
1
ECON 0.18 0.13 1
CYC (0.00) (0.00)
ROA 0.09
(0.00)
0.03
(0.00)
0.07
(0.00)
1
TOTAL -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1
ASSETS (0.29) (0.00) (0.17) (0.77)
LEV 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.14 1
(0.33) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
AREC 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 1
(0.14) (0.47) (0.00) (0.39) (0.63) (0.87)
A REV 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.19 1
(0.06) (0.24) (0.00) (0.25) (0.57) (0.21) (0.00)
PPE -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.18 1
(0.52) (0.00) (0.03) (0.23) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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4.3 Empirical Results
Table 4.3 reports the results of the panel estimation of equation 2.1 using 
pooled regression, fixed effects, and random effects models for the balanced panel 
for the period 2000-2010. The estimates and fit for all three regression models are 
good as evidenced by relatively high R2.
The empirical results show that earnings management and return on assets 
are positively related as evident from the statistically significant positive 
coefficient (hypothesis 1). Growth-based firms tend to be smaller in size and 
because of their growth focus have an increased motivation to engage in earnings 
management, which is validated by this empirical result. In all models the 
coefficient for return on assets is positive and relatively high compared to other 
independent variables, and is statistically significant at 1% level.
The empirical results also show a positive relationship between firm 
leverage and earnings management (hypothesis 2). Firms that are highly 
leveraged have the potential to suffer additional complications from having 
quarterly earnings that are lower than expectations. An obvious case would be 
that a significant decrease in their share price from a poor earnings report would 
fundamentally alter their debt-to-equity ratio in a negative way. This could lead to 
additional financing costs as the firm’s credit rating or ability to repay existing 
debt could be jeopardized. The coefficient sign for leverage was expected across 
all models, however it was not significant in the fixed effects model which is our 
preferred model. Because of the large sample size it is likely that heterogeneous
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firm leverage has less of an effect on earnings management than was 
hypothesized.
Among the control variables, total assets (TA) was hypothesized to have a 
positive sign in hypothesis 3, with the rationale being that large firms have highly 
compensated managers compared to smaller firms. Because of the large 
compensation (especially performance-based compensation) that comes with the 
management of very large firms, it was hypothesized that as firm size increases, 
discretionary accrual amounts would also increase as the motivation for managers 
to engage in earnings management is greater. Our results do not validate this 
hypothesis as we find a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and 
total assets. As company size (as measured by total assets) increases, it appears 
that earnings management in the form of discretionary accruals decreases 
consistently among all three models. This could be explained by the fact that as 
companies achieve a large size, they are audited more thoroughly, and also have 
greater monitoring by individual and institutional shareholders and industry 
analysts, removing the ‘flexibility’ that managers of smaller, less closely 
monitored firms would have. It should be noted that this coefficient log of total 
assets has a very low value, and only the fixed effects model yielded statistically 
significant results.
The SOX variable in hypothesis 4 was posited to have a negative 
relationship to discretionary accrual values. Introduction of regulations like the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been shown to decrease accrual-based earnings 
management by a number of researchers (Graham et al. 2005, Cohen et al. 2007,
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Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Our results are at variance with these results. In all 
three regression models, the SOX variable was positively related to discretionary 
accruals and was statistically significant (at 1% level). A possible explanation for 
the positive association could be that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is more about 
reforms at internal control of firms rather than earnings management.
As hypothesized in Chapter 2 (hypothesis 5), the business cycle dummy 
has the predicted sign (positive) implying that earnings management varies with 
phases of the business cycle; it is high during upward phases o f the business cycle 
and lower during contractionary phases o f the business cycle. The variable is also 
statistically significant. This result is similar to the results of Kang et al. (2010). 
Firms indulge in higher earnings management (by maintaining large discretionary 
accruals) to maintain earnings similar to their industry peers regardless o f their 
actual performance. During recessionary periods, there is a contraction in the 
economy as a whole, and this decrease is likely caused by macroeconomic events 
outside of any specific industry. Since all firms experience a decrease in stock 
value regardless of their relative peer-related performance, managers will take this 
opportunity to reverse the discretionary accruals they accumulated during the 
previous period of economic expansion.
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Table 4.3 Determinants of Discretionary Accruals in the United States — 
2000-2010.
The dependent variable is DA (discretionary accruals). SOX is a dummy variable 
with a value o f 0 previous to the introduction o f the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and a 
value o f 1 after. BUSjCYC is a dummy variable with a value o f  0 fo r  any year 
where there was a contractionary quarter during the year and a value o f 1 during 
years with four quarters o f  economic expansion. ROA is earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by total assets. Total Assets is the natural logarithm o f  firm  
total assets. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio.
Expected
Sign
Pooled Fixed Effects Random
Effects
Constant +/- -0.090 0.254 -0.089
(0.021)*** (0.084)*** (0.021)***
SOX (-) 0.057 0.072 0.057
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)***
BUSCYC + 0.089 0.082 0.089
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
ROA + 0.114 0.098 0.114
(0.013)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)***
Log(Total + -0.001 -0.025 -0.001
Assets) (0.001) (0.006)*** (0.002)
LEV + 0.028 0.026 0.029
(0.011)* (0.019) O © * *
Observations 11964 11964 11964
(N)
R2 0.045 0.047 0.045
Adj-R2 0.045 0.028 0.045
Jarque-Bera 96265602*** 49217241*** 96265602***
Normality
test of
residuals
Hausman 35.04***
Test (x2
statistic)
Note:
Figures in brackets are standard errors.
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively (two- 
sided test).
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We had presented empirical results of the models pooled, fixed effect, and 
random effect. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), the pooled regression 
model suffers from correlation of independent variables with the error term. 
Moreover, the pooled regression model does not recognize or model 
heterogeneity of firms in the panel which is a major limitation of pooled 
regression estimates. Fixed effects and random effects models recognize 
heterogeneity among firms and are attractive from a statistical inference point o f 
view. A comparison of the fixed effects and random effects models was done 
using the Hausman test. The large and significant value of the Hausman statistic 
shows that there is a significant difference between the coefficients of the two 
models, and therefore the fixed effect model would be the more prudent choice.
4.4 Summary o f Results
The fixed effect model assumes that there are individual firm specific 
effects correlated with the independent variables, and this makes intrinsic sense, 
as yearly firm-specific discretionary accrual values are likely linked to the yearly 
financial variables of the firm, in addition to the current macroeconomic 
environment. The results show a strong relationship between the overall business 
cycle and firm-specific discretionary accrual values. Specifically, discretionary 
accruals increase during times of economic expansion, and decrease during 
contractionary periods. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act appears to have had little effect 
on discretionary accrual values, as these values have increased since the 
introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley. Additionally, as firm size increases (measured in 
total assets) discretionary accrual values decrease. This is likely attributed to the
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fact that large firms have higher quality boards, and audit committees meet with 
greater frequency as well as have greater financial sophistication. This constrains 
managerial propensity to engage in discretionary accruals-based earnings 
management (Xie et al. 2003).
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS
This study has been undertaken at a time of considerable global economic 
uncertainty stemming from the 2008 recession centered in the United States and 
Europe. Although this recession has many causes, one issue that has exacerbated 
the crisis is a lack of transparency in the financial reporting of firms. An 
important issue in financial reporting is the extent to which managers manipulate 
reported earnings. Following Healy (1985), accrual-based earnings management 
measures continue to be a main focus of academic research. Compared to earlier 
studies, our study focusses on the impact of business cycles on earnings 
management in the United States over 11 years using 1125 firms (2000-2010). The 
results show that in economic expansionary times firms actively engage in 
earnings management to maintain earnings levels comparable to their industry 
peers. Similarly, during contractionary times when share prices fall across the all 
industries (regardless of firm-specific performance), these accrual accounts will 
be ‘washed’ clean. During recessions, shareholders expect poor earnings, and 
having large negative discretionary accruals (to offset the positive ones created 
during expansionary periods) has little effect on overall market sentiment, and 
therefore individual firm share prices.
This study validates some of the empirical results from prior earnings 
management research but also gives some additional insights. As shown by
50
existing research, growth-oriented firms demonstrate higher discretionary accrual 
amounts versus value-oriented firms on the aggregate. Additionally, larger firms 
appear to have lower discretionary accrual amounts (as a percentage of total 
assets). This result has also been found by many prior studies, namely that larger 
firms are monitored more closely by auditors, shareholders, analysts, and 
regulators. Additionally, large firms tend to have more sophisticated boards and 
auditing committees, limiting opportunities by managers of large firms to engage 
in earnings management.
Contrary to a number of prior studies, we found across all pooled 
regression models that the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) has not 
abated earnings management among US firms. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
has likely created additional transparency in financial reporting, its limited effect 
on discretionary accruals-based earnings management may simple be accredited 
to the great difficulty in identifying discretionary accruals from financial 
statements.
This study contributes to the existing literature on earnings management 
by illustrating a highly significant positive connection between the level of 
earnings management in the major US firms over a long period of time (2000- 
2010). An opportunity for future research would be a study of economic cycles 
and discretionary accruals among firms using the ‘reversals’ development in 
discretionary accruals by Baber et al., 2011 and Dechow et al., 2012.
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